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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the likely impact of the Administration tax reform
plan on housing. Our analysis incorporates two general equilibrium impacts ——
aone percentage point decline in the level of interest rates and a decrease in
the property tax rate on principal residences ——andcorrects errors regarding
discount rates and refinancing in the basic rental model.
A 7 percent increase in market rents (11 percent without the decline in
interest rates) is projected. Consideration of the individual components of
the Administration plan suggests that the only significant negative provision
is the cut in the personal tax rate from 0.53 (including a 6 percent state and
local rate deductible at the Federal level) to 0.41. Without this cut (and the
decline in interest rates which is largely attributable to the cut), market
rents would fall by 6 percent. Rents rise only because rental housing is a
negatively taxed asset in the sense that a tax cut lowers the supply of the
asset.
The general—equilibriwn effects will offset the negative direct effects——
the cut in marginal tax rates and loss of deductibility of property taxes ——on
owner—occupied housing in the aggregate. However, this housing will generally
be cheaper for households with incomes below $40,000 ——especiallybelow
$25,000 ——butwill be more expensive for those with incomes above $60,000.
This constitutes an improvement in both efficiency and equity because under
current law the price of owner housing services is far lower for high income
households than for low income households. Homeownership rates should increase
by 2 to 3 percentage points for households with incomes below $40,000 and 1 to
2 percentage points in the aggregate.
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In May 1985, the Administration finally endorsed a specific tax reform
proposal. This was at least the fifth major proposal advanced, following
Hall—Rabuska, Bradley—Gephardt, Kemp—Kasten and the Treasury Department.1
Analyses of the Administration plan by Downs, Follain, the Homebuilders (NAHB,
1985b) •andMaisel and Quigley have already appeared; however, little
agreement exists among them. To illustrate, both Downs and Follain expect a 7
percent increase in rents, but the NAHE anticipates increases of 20 to 25
percent or more. None of these incorporates a change in the level of interest
rates. Maisel and Quigley agree with NAHB if interest rates do not change, but
because they anticipate a 2.6 percentage point rate decline, they expect a mere
3 percent rise in rents.
The wide range of estimated impacts alone suggests value in further
analysis. In addition, several features of the underlying models commonly
employed seem inappropriate, and neither zero nor the 2.6 percentage point
decline in interest rates is reasonable. Correcting these features and
incorporating a plausible decline in rates will lead to a better understanding
of the Administration plan and its likely impact on housing.
The basic rental model has two shortcomings. First, the stream of tax
depreciation allowances is discounted by the same rate used to discount the
risky net operating income stream. Finance theory suggests that near—certain
cash flows should be discounted by a near risk—free rate and risky cash flows
by a risky rate. Second, additional borrowing to prevent the debt ratio from
falling below its optimal level is not allowed. Prohibition against additional
borrowing creates artificial gains from trading. Analyses of owner—occupied
housing have one common deficiency. Elimination of the deductibility of—2—
property taxes will not reduce demand to the extent implied in existing models
because property tax rates (and the Supply of local services) will be reduced
to some extent in responsetothe loss of deductibility.
All the major tax reform proposals advanced to date will lower interest
rates, although the magnitude of the decline will vary with the specific
proposal (Hendershott, 1985) .Reductionsin investment incentives, such as
elimination of the investment tax credit and decreases in tax rates at which
households deduct interest expense, will lower real capital outlays and thus
the demand for funds; reduced taxation of returns to savers will increase the
supply of funds. On both accounts, interest rates will decline.2 The NAHB
recognized this in their analysis of Bradley—Gephardt, Kemp—Kasten and the
original Treasury plan (l985a, p. 30) but not in their more recent study.
Maisel and Quigley have recently joined us (l984c, 1985) in contending that
rates will fall, but they threaten to give the position a bad name with the
enormity of their assumed decline. A single percentage point decline is
plausible (Hendershott, 1985) and is assumed in the calculations reported
below.
The paper is divided into three sections and a summary. The first two
deal with the measurement of equilibrium rents, for owner and rental housing
respectively, under both current law and the proposed reform. A tax reform can
alter asset prices, investor rates of return, and/or equilibrium rents
(explicit for rental housing, implicit for owner housing) .Whileall three
variables might be expected to change, the primary adjustment will come in
rents because capital market equilibrium and production costs, respectively,
drive rates of return and asset values.3 The third section reports the
estimated impact of the reforms on these rents and on the homeownership rate.—3—
I. Owner—Occupied Housing
Three 'prices° of owner—occupied housing services are relevant: the
average price which influences the tenure—choice decision, the marginal price
which determines the quantity demanded assuming the household choices to own,
and the "constrained" price for households that find owner housing unaffordable
in the sense that they cannot purchase the optimal amount dictated by the
marginal Price. How these prices would be measured under both current law and
the Administration plan is the subject of this section.
A. The Price of Owner—Occupied Housing Services
Households will purchase sufficient housing so that the rents from the
last dollar spent plus the expected capital gains on that dollar equals the
costs of obtaining the rents and gains. The costs included financing, upkeep
and property taxes. Put another way, households will purchase sufficient
housing so that the present value of all the after—tax cash flows, including
the implicit rents, generated by the last dollar of house equals the equity the
household supplies to obtain that dollar of house. If the rents and house
price are expected to grow at rate —d (inflation less depreciation), v portion
of the house is debt financed at rate i and the outstanding loan balance in
period t is Lt. the annual maintenance and property tax rates are in and t,the
household is in the Tmarginaltax bracket and has a required after—tax return
on equity invested in the house of e, and the household expects to hold the
house for N years, the rental cost of owner—occupied housing services from one
dollar of housing can be deduced by solving equation (1) for H:—4—
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Forthe first dollars of house purchased, the right side of the equation
exceeds the left because R is initially high. However, R declines as more
dollars are purchased; eventually equality holds and the demand of the
household is determined.
Equation (1) can be simplified in a number of illuminating ways. First,




where ea is the required return on all—equity financed houses. The j
subscripts, which were not included in equation (1) for simplicity, allow for
ea and r, and thus R, tovary across households (the other variables also
likely vary, but not in a systematic way). Next, allow for debt financing in
which the loan—to—value ratio is continuously maintained at v. In thiscase,
L =v(l+lr_d)t_l,AL =v(r—d)(l+lr.d)t and
P.. =r.—w+ d+m+(l—T)r , (2) J J p
where r. =v(l—r.)i+(l—v)e.is the "weighted average cost of capital."
In general, i is interpreted as the risk—free debt rate ofmaturity N.
This is less than the commonly employed home mortgage rate because the latter
includes premiums to compensate lenders for the prepayment and defaultoptions
that households will, in an expected value sense, exercisesystematically to
the detriment of lenders. If one were to include these premiumsas negative—5—
cash flows in equation (1), then one should also include the present value of
these probable gains from exercising the options as positive cash flows. We
assume fair premiums in the sense that the cost and value of the options
cancel.
The equity rate can be expressed as the after—tax debt rate plus a risk
premium, p, which we assume for. simplicity to be constant across households:
e. =(l—r.)i+p. (3)
J J
Because the risk per dollar of equity investment is less on all—equity financed
investments than on partially debt—financed investments,
a a e. =(l—r.)i+p
J J
where Note that if p p/(l—v), then r. =e.In our analysis, we
follow the weighted—average cost of capital approach, but we modify (3) to
reflect the attractiveness of tax—exempt securities to high—income households:3
I(l—r)i +p e. max.ç j , (3)
Ii.e
where 1e the exempt rate, is assumed to equal 0.7± under current law and 0.78i
under the Administration plan (Hendershott, 1985)
In our empirical work, equation (1) is solved for R, after applying a 6
percent selling cost. We assume N =8(years), it= 005,a 0.012 depreciation
rate on the structure which is 0.83 of the total investment so d =.01,r =
p
0.012, m =0.035,and a 30—year amortizing debt—instrument initially financing
80 percent of the house at an 11 percent rate. The risk premium,p,forthis
equity investment which rises from 20 percent of the initial property value to,
under our other assumptions, 45 percent of the value after 8 years is assumed
to be 0.075.—6—
Equation (1) presumes that households can purchase the optimal quantity
of housing. More specifically, the household is presumed to be able to make a
down payment of 20 percent of the value of the economically optimal house and
to have sufficient income to qualify for a loan for the remaining 80 percent.
Other combinations of equity and debt would not appreciably alter the results,
but what about households that cannot achieve any combination (households that
find housing "unaffordable")? These households could be renters or they could
own a smaller house than the optimal, in which case the left side of equation
(1) is less than the right and the calculation of R is not meaningful. To
account for such households, initial monthly mortgage and property tax
payments, net of tax savings, are also computed. In these calculations, the
current 0.12 mortgage rate is used, not the 0.11 risk—free rate.
The tenure decision of households involves a comparison of the cost of
obtaining housing services from owner—occupied housing relative to the cost of
obtaining the same services from rental housing. One might be tempted to
simply take the R. from equation (1) and compare it with the equilibrium rents
in the rental market. However, the cost of obtaining the average dollar's
worth of owner—occupied housing services, not the marginal dollar, is required
here. Thus the t.forthis calculation must be redefined as the average tax
rate at which housing related expenditures, including forgone interest on
invested equity, are deducted (Hendershott and Slemrod, 1983)
B. The Administration Plan and Owner—Occupied Housing
The Administration plan would alter the rental cost of owner—occupied
housing in three ways. First, property taxes would no longer be deductible at
the federal level; the l—t multiplying r in equation (1) becomes unity.
Second, marginal federal taxes are cut ——froma maximum of 0.50 to 0.35 or by
0.15 ——generallylowering the tax rate at which interest is deductible in (1)—7—
and raising e in (3). However, the loss of the deductibility of state and
local taxes partially offsets this decline; with an assumed maximum state and
local rate of 0.06 deductible against federal taxes under current law but not
under the reform, the decline in the maximum tinequation (1) is only 0.12.
Third, interest rates will decrease by a percentage point, and e will also
decline via (3) -
Becausethe tax rates relevant to both the quantity—demanded and tenure—
choice decisions vary widely across households, the rental costs are computed
for three types of households at five income levels. The households considered
are: married filing jointly with one earner and two dependents, married filing
jointly with two earners and no dependents, and single with no dependents. A
variety of income tax rates have been computed for these households assuming
adjusted gross income (AGI) of $17,500, $27,500, $40,000, $70,000 and $130,000.
To hold resources constant, owning households with AGIs, assuming they rented,
are compared to renting households with the same AGIs. Separate data are
calculated for renting and owning households. The calculations assume:
(1) the nonsingle households have average fringe benefits and nonhousing
itemized deductions (excluding State and local income taxes) of their
income classes (based on 1982 Statistics of Income data) ;single
households are assumed to differ in that their other miscellaneous
deductions are only half of their income classes and they have no excess
medical deductions,
(2)owning households purchase houses of dollar value equal to twice
their AGI5 and pay property taxes equal to 1.2 percent of their house
values,
(3) the second spouse income in two earner households is assumed toaccount
for 40 percent of total income,—8—
(4) the average loan—to--value ratio over the assumed 8—year holding period
is 70 percent (the calculations are not sensitive to this assumption)
and
(5) marginal state and local income tax rates are 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 5.0, and
6.0 percent of state taxable income for households with Ads of $17,500
through $130,000 respectively, and states allow the same deductions for
computing AOl and the same itemized deductions from AOl to calculate
state taxable income as the federal government does.
The first section of each panel in Table 1 provides the renter and owner
marginal tax rates and the tenure choice tax rate at different income levels
under current law.4 The total marginal rate for both owners and renters is the
marginal federal rate plus the assumed state and local rate marked down to
reflect its deductibility at the federal level.5 The second sections provide
comparable data for the Administration plan. This plan would modestly raise
Ads by counting the first $120 of health insurance benefits as income and
significantly increase taxable income by eliminating deductions for state and
local income, sales and property taxes. On the other hand, the exemption for
self, spouse, and dependents would be almost doubled to $2,000, and marginal
federal tax rates would be lowered generally.
The marginal tax rates relevant to the quantity of owner—occupied housing
demanded range from 18 to 41 percent for married households with one wage
earner and two dependents (HH1). These rates are slightly higher than the
corresponding current law marginal rate at the lowest income level considered,
reflecting the initially higher 15 percent federal rate and the lack of
deductibility of state and local income taxes at the federal level. At income
levels above approximately $25,000, the marginal rates for owners under the
reform are roughly a sixth lower than current law.—9—
Married households with two wage earners and no dependents (HH2) are
typical of many first—time home buyers. While the average tax burden of these
households differs from HH1 under both current law and the reform, the second
panel of Table 1 reveals that marginal rates are identical for the two
household types under current law and nearly so under the reform. The loss of
two exemptions at the $40,000 AGI level is just enough to leave HH2 owners in
the 29 percent marginal bracket (versus 19 percent for HH1 owners)
Marginal rates are quite different for single households with no
dependents (HH3) ,rangingfrom 22 to 53 percent for owners under current law.
These rates are nearly half again as high (except at the highest income level)
as the current law rates for HI-Il owners. The Administration plan would reduce
these marginal rates approximately 20 percent at all income levels.
Next consider the tax rate relevant to the tenure choice decision: the
average rate at which housing related expenses are deducted. For all
households but those at the lowest income level considered, the tenure choice
tax rate lies between the marginal tax rates for owners and renters under
current law. Tenure choice tax rates that are below the owner marginal rate
would be the rule, rather than the exception at low to moderate incomes under
the reform proposal because deductions for excess medical expenses and other
"miscellaneous" items would be effectively eliminated or greatly reduced. No
state and local tax deductions would be allowed and consumer interest expense
would be limited for high income households. Moreover, the zero bracket amount
would be raised to $4,000. These changes would typically result in wasted
housing—related deductions (because the zero bracket amount exceeds nonhousing
itemized deductions) except at higher incomes, and thus the tenure—choice rate,
a weighted average of zero and the marginal tax rates, would be less than the
marginal rate. The average cost of owner housing will therefore tend to rise.—10-
11. Rental Housing
Analysts generally assess the impact of tax reforms on rental housing by
asking how the reforms would alter the required initial rents on a prototype
residential project. The answer is obtained by manipulating an equality
between the equity investment in the project and the present value of the cash
flows the project is expected to generate. This procedure is described below
with particular care being given to the choice of discount rates employed and
financing assumptions made.
A. The Equilibrium Level of Rents
Equation (1) must be modified in a number of ways to make it applicable
to rental housing. First, the rent and maintainance terms must be multiplied
by l—T, the former being taxed and the latter deductible. Second, tax
depreciation allowances can be deducted so rz must be added, where z, the
present value of the deductions, is defined by
N
dxt Z Ltl(l+x)
dx is the deduction on a dollar initial investment in structures, and x is the
appropriate discount rate. Third, a tax is due upon sale so TAXC/(l+e)N must
be subtracted, where
TAXC =T(YdXt
—N/N*)+ Tcg[ (1—s) (l+id)N_(1_N,/N)] (4)
under current law, and B is the selling cost as a proportion of asset value.
The first term is the recapture of accelerated depreciation (N is the minimum
number of years over which the property can be depreciated and N is the
minimum of N and N*) ,andthe second term is the gains tax applied to the sale
price net of the adjusted basis. Finally, construction period interest and—"-
property taxes (CPIT) must be accounted for and all the terms must be
discounted additional periods to account for the lag between construction and
operation. Hendershott and Shilling (1982a) provide a discussion of the
nitty—gritty on most of these points.
Our methodology for computing rent levels under current law and the
Administration proposal differs from that typically employed by real estate
analysts in two key respects. First is the discount rate Cx) used in
calculating the present value of tax depreciation allowances. Financial
economists argue that the relatively Certain depreciation deductions should be
discounted at a lower (less risky) discount rate than the relatively risky
opering incomes (Brealey and Myers, 1984, p. 559). By a lower discount rate,
.e ,aear, srmething less than the weighted—average cost of capital, say the 8—
year tax—exempt rate, and far less than the required equity return, e. Of
course, one ..c'Lld discount all cash flows by the same rate, call it d, that
lies between eridiand gives the same V value.
What differ'nce does it make whether one discounts all cash flows by d or
some by e and some 1e? As long as tax reforms don't alter the pattern and
relative importance of tax depreciation allowances, it doesn't make any
difference. But the Administration proposal would substantially change the
depreciation write of f pattern, shifting from the front—loaded ACRS to back—
loaded systems (but with more than 100 percent writeoff owing to the indexation
of the depreciable base). Whether the present value of the new tax
depreciation schedule is better or worse (or how much worse) than ACRS depends
crucially on which discount rate is used. Too high a discount rate would
discriminate against the later Administration deductions, while too low a rate
would favor them. Real estate analysts have been using the highest possible
rate, the required return on equity.—12—
Another issue is the treatment of debt and equity in the model. At the
margin (or at the optimal loan—to—value ratio) ,theafter—tax cost of debt
equals the cost of equity. The "average" cost of debt is, of course, "cheaper"
because the debt is on average less risky. By using a two—tiered pricing
approach, a low cost for debt and high cost for equity, the models are very
sensitive to the loan—to—value ratio. In the models, the initial loan—to—value
ratio is generally set at a plausible 70 to 80 percent level, but the loan is
then presumed to amortize. Given that the asset value is generally assumed to
inflate, the actual loan—to—value ratio falls significantly over time. After
five years, the ratio on a property inflating at 4 percent per year financed
with a 12½%, 25—year, 75% loan—to—value, fixed—rate mortgage would be 59%;
after ten years the ratio would be 45%. Holding the equity rate constant, when
it should be falling because the risk on the average equity dollar is falling,
results in discounting distant cash flows, especially near—certain tax
depreciation allowances, at too high a rate.
If a loan—to—value ratio of, say, two—thirds is optimal, letting the
loan—to—value ratio decline to 59 percent after 5 years and 45 percent after 10
years could cause a significant economic loss to equity investors. Their
obvious response would be to renegotiate a higher loan ——torefinance. But
this response is not allowed in the typical real estate valuation model. The
Only way to reestablish a high loan—to—value ratio is to trade the property.
Thus the "gains from trading" properties in these models include gains from
reestablishing the optimal loan—to—value ratio, as well as from establishing a
higher depreciable base. These gains must, of course, be weighed against sales
costs and capital gains taxes at the time of sale.
Under the Administration plan, trading would be far less rewarding than
under current law. There are fewer gains from establishing a higher base
because the base is already indexed and depreciation is not frontloaded. As a—13—
result, "optimal expected future trading is minimal. If, however, trading is
the only way to reestablish the desired loan—to—value ratio, trading will occur
even if pure trading is unprofitable. Thus prohibition of refinancing, like
the single discount rate assumption, could discriminate against the
Administration reform proposal.
Many of the empirical assumptions were stated above. The depreciation
rates differ slightly from owner—occupied housing owing to different land—to—
value ratios and expected behavior of tenents. The depreciation rate for the
asset price is Set at 0.025 and for the rent stream is 0.0175. Also t+ mis
p
0.045. The holding period is determined endogenously as that which minimizes
the rental price (Hendershott and Ling, 1984b).
B. The Administration Plan and Rental Housing
A comparison of the depreciable—real—estate provisions of current law and
the Administration proposal is given in Table 2. Whether the individual
changes would be beneficial or harmful to real estate is of interest. The
Administration plan lowers the assumed tax rate from 0.53 to 0.41. Most
industries (and households) benefit from tax cuts, Only if an industry is
currently negatively taxed (would be less profitable if it werent taxed at
all) ,woulda tax cut be harmful.
The proposed capital gains treatment is almost certainly more favorable
than that under current law. Consider land first. Fifty percent of the
lowerd regular rate (.5x.41 =.205)is marginally less than forty percent of
the current rate (.4x.53 =.212).Moreover, unless land increases in real
value, no tax would be paid. Thus capital gains on land are certain to be
taxed at a lower rate. Capital gains taxes on structures will also probably be
lower. Approximating dx as constant over time, the tax will be—14—
N * N TAXA =
[(l—)(l+Tr—d) —(1+1r—dx) J, (5) cg
*
where itisthe general CPI appreciation rate. Compare this expression with
the tax liability under current luW as measured in equation (4) .If
depreciation allowances were not accelerated [the first sum in (4) is zero and
* dx=d]and real estate appreciates at the general inflation rate (it=it
thena significant tax liability exists under current law because the
depreciation basis is not indexed, but no liability would be incurred under the
Administration plan. If accelerated depreciation does exist (dx)d),a
liability will be incurred under the reform, but a far greater liability would
exist under current law owing to recapture at regular rates. Only if real—
estate inflation far exceeds general inflation would a greater capital gains,
tax exist under the reform than under current law.
Turning to the timing of deductions, the present value of tax
depreciation allowances under the Administration plan in a five percent
inflation world, using a 9 percent nominal after—tax discount rate, is the same
0.61 per dollar of property that the value is under current law. That is, with
five percent inflation, the Administration plan is as generous as current law.
Because other analysts apply a much higher discount rate, they find the
depreciation change to be negative for real estate. We have argued against use
of a higher discount rate for the near riskiess depreciation deductions and
believe the correct rate currently is just under 9 percent.
The altered treatment of CPIT is a slight negative; rather than being
written off over 10 years, these expenses would be capitalized under the
Administration plan and written off over 28 years. Again using a 9percent
discount rate, the present value would fall from 0.036per dollar of property
to 0.030.—15—
Under current tax regulations, all investments of individuals and
partnerships, other than investments in real estate, are subject to 'at—risk"
limitations, i.e., a taxpayers's loss for any taxable year is limited to the
amount the taxpayer has invested or has at—risk in the investment. Generally,
the amount at—risk is the sum of the taxpayers' cash contributions to the
activity and amounts borrowed for which the taxpayer has personal liability for
repayment (recourse debt only). The amount at—risk is increased by the
taxpayer's share of taxable income and subsequent cash contributions and is
decreased by his share of tax losses and cash distributions.
The Administration plan would make income—producing real estate subject
to at—risk rules. Because most real—estate investments are highly leveraged
with nonrecourse mortgage debt and have generous depreciation allowances,
significant losses can be incurred in the initial years of the investment. If
interest rates (and loan—to—value ratios) are high enough, these losses will
cumulate to more than the investor's equity contributions, in the absence of
altered investor behavior, and some tax losses will not be deductible in the
year in which they are incurred.7
Current law limits investment interest expense to $10,000 plus net
investment income8, but most real estate related interest expense (net leased
property and land being the primary exceptions) is exempt from this limitation.
The Administration plan would decrease the maximum current deduction for
investment interest expense to $5,000 plus net investment income and would
include both consumer interest expense and interest expense on limited
partnerships in the interest limitation. The impact of including the latter
would be partially offset by the expansion of net investment income to include
the taxpayer's share of income from limited partnerships (and his distributive
share of income from Subchapter S corporations in which the taxpayer does not
actively participate in management). The plan would be phased—in beginning in—16—
1986, with only 10 percent of newly limited investment interest initially
subject to the limitation. In each of the subsequent nine taxable years, the
percentage would be increased by 10 percentage points.
With a 12% mortgage interest rate and a 75% loan—to—value ratio, the
Administrations at risk and investment interest provisions would not bind on
investors and thus could not impact on rents. Even with an 85% loan—to—value
ratio, the provisions would not bind if interest rates declined by a percentage
point. Moreover, while the provisions would clearly bind in a higher inflation
and interest rate environment (in which case the depreciation and capital gains
provisions of the Administration plan would become even more attractive
relative to current law) ,behavioralresponses by investors would virtually
eliminate any negative impact.
The most likely behavioral response of investors to a binding at—risk
provision would be to assume some personal liability for mortgage indebtedness,
either at purchase or subsequently as needed, to ensure full deductibility of
tax losses when they are incurred. The assumpt1on of personal liability for
losses beyond the actual equity does transfer some risk from the lender to the
investor. However, the lender would presumably be charging for this risk: an
85 percent loan costs more than a 75 percent loan. Thus, the increased risk of
the investor and the resultant higher required return on equity is roughly
balanced by a lower loan rate; equilibrium rents would not rise noticeably.
Because the investment interest limitation applies only to limited partnerships
(and passive interests in Subchapter S corporations) ,thelikely response to
binding interest limitations would be a change in the ownership form to general
partnerships and sole proprietorships.—17-.
III.Results
The results are discussed in three parts. First, the equilibrium change
in rents is computed. This is the relevant statistic for inclusion in both the
tenure—choice and quantity—demanded (for those who rent) decisions. Second,
the likely impact of the reform on homeownership rates for households at the
five income levels are reported. Third, percentage changes in the rental price
for owner—occupied housing services are provided.
A. The Equilibrium Rent Level
The top part of Table 3 contains calculations of the impact on "rents' of
(1) all provisions of the Administration plan except the personal tax rate cut
and (2) the cut in the personal tax rate. The basic valuation model is varied
in two dimensions: the refinancing assumption and the discounting method. The
first calculation assumes zero refinancing; the others allow for Continuous
refinancing. More specifically, in the first variant the project is initially
financed with a 75%—25 year 11 percent amortizing loan. In the other
calculations, the loan is two—thirds of initial value and then stays at two—
thirds of value over time.
As for discounting, the first two calculations are based on a single
0.152 discount rate, calculated as the ten—year tax—exempt rate ——0.7times
our 0.11 interest rate ——plusa risk premium of 0.075. The remaining
calculations follow the dual—discount method; the exempt rate plus 0.01 is
used for the relatively certain tax depreciation and construction period
interest and property tax write—offs, and a higher 0.239 equity rate is applied
to the other cash flows. This equity rate is that which, in conjunction with
the 0.087 tax—exempt rate, gives the same present value of the cash flows under
current law as does the single 0.152 discount rate.—18—
Note the difference the model changes make: going from zero refinancing
and a single discount rate to continuous refinancing and the dual rate lowers
the projected increase in residential rents from 12% to —6%. Taking the
continuous refinancing first attributes 15 of the 18 point decline to the dual
discount rate and only 3 to the refinancing; taking the dual discount rate
first would lay 12 of the points on the discount rate and 6 on the refinancing.
The next number in Table 3 is the estimated impact on residential rents
of the cut in the personal tax rate from 0.53 (a fifty percent Federal rate
plus a deductible six percent State and local rate) to 0.41. The result is a
15 percent increase in rents. This sharp increase in response to a tax cut
illustrates just how negatively taxed rental housing is under current law.
Because a major goal of tax reform is to improve economic efficiency by taxing
different sources of income and returns from capital assets more equally, one
would anticipate that negatively taxed activities would not fare well.
Results for the full impact of the plan, both with and without a one
percentage point decline in interest rates, are then reported. With the rate
decline, the increase in rents is 7 percent. This rise is modest, especially
in light of the fact that renters are scheduled to receive most of the personal
tax Cut contained in the Administration plan. For two of the three household
types, the average tax rate will fall by 0.021 or more at the $17,500 level-and
by larger amounts at higher income levels. That is, even if these households
spend 30 percent of their incomes on rent, they would be able to continue to
rent the same units (would spend .3 x .07 =.021on rent) and still purchase
the same amount or more of other goods and services. For the third household
type (married, two earners, no dependents) ,thetax cut is lower (the cut would
be about as great if for the other household for two—earner households with two
dependents).—19—
The last nunther in Table 3 is a crude rent calculation for commercial
properties. These properties are treated less favorably under current law than
residential properties are because a different recapture provision causes most
investors to choose straight—line depreciation. Thus, a switch to a new tax
regime that treats residential and commercial properties symmetrically will
have a less negative impact on commercial properties than on residential. The
Administration plan should actually be slightly favorable to commercial real
estate (initial net operating incomes will be lower after enactment of the
reform than before).
B. Tenure Choice
Because the Administration plan both raises the zero bracket amount and
reduces nonhousing—related deductions, some housing deductions will be wasted.
This increases the average cost of obtaining services from owner—occupied
housing. However, the increase is generally less than the 7 percent computed
increase in rents, so the homeownership rate will tend to rise.
To deduce the expected change in homeownership, the equation estimated by
Hendershott and Shilling (l982b) is employed. This equation relates the odds
of owning to the average cost of housing services in the two tenure modes. The
resulting changes in homeownership rates for the three household types at the
five income levels are listed in Table 4. As can be seen, the rate generally
rises, but the increase is minimal at higher income levels (above $60,000)
Moreover, for single households the rate would decline slightly at incomes
above-about $30,000. A one or two percentage point increase in the aggregate
homeownership rate is likely.—20—
C.Owner—Occupied Housing
Table 5 contains percentage changes in the rental price for owner—
to offset the loss of deductibility)
In the absence of affordability constraints, the rental price, after—tax
income and tastes determine a household's demand for housing services. As can
be seen in the top panel of Table 5, the rental price falls for low and middle
income joint filers even without a decline in property tax rates. For single
earners with two dependents, housing demand will rise at income levels up to
about $35,000; for two—earners with no dependents, the cut of f is about
$50,000. In contrast, the price will rise for virtually all single owning
households arid the percentage increase exceeds 10 percent for those with
incomes above about $55,000. This is because marginal tax rates are cut more
sharply for singles, especially at higher income levels.
Where affordability is a problem, after—tax mortgage and property tax
payments are a useful measure of "price'. The percentage changes of these,
shown in Table 6, have the same general pattern as the percentage changes in
rental prices in Table 5. The difference is a light1y greater increase for
high—income joint filers and a near doubling of the increase for singles at all
occupied housing services for the three household types
levels. Table 6 lists the percentage change in the afte
and property tax payments. Each reports results for the
interest rates and a one percentage point decline. Only
upon the reasonable decline in rates are discussed; the
reported for comparison purposes only. Each table also
increase in the net—of—tax property tax rate (a constant
deductibility) and a constant net—of—tax rate (a decline
at the five income




reports results for an
rate but lost
in property tax rates—21—
levels. The near doubling follows from the base upon which percentage
increases are computed being about half as large for the payment calculation as
for the rental price calculation.
The net—of—tax property tax rate is the price of obtaining municipally—
provided services (Tiebout, 1956). Should the price rise owing to a reduction
in federal deductibility, the demand for these services will decline and a call
for a cut in the property tax rate will arise. In the limit (a perfectly
elastic demand for municipal services) ,theproperty tax rate will decline
sufficiently to offset the reduced deductibility. The second panel of Tables 5
and 6 present this limiting case. The expected result falls somewhere between
the lower—interest—rate portions of the top and bottom panels.
The net impact of the changes for owner—occupied housing is difficult to
discern. There are far fewer single owning households that joint filers, and
median household income is under $30,000. On the other hand, the median income
of owners, especially joint—filers is probably about $40,000. Moreover, higher
income households obviously spend more on housing than lower income households
so even if more households experience price declines than increases, the total
demand for housing by owners could decline. Overall, we expect no change in
the quantity of housing demanded by existing owners and a slight increase in
total owner demand owing to a small projected increase in the homeownership
rate.—22—
IV. Summary
Our analysis of the impact of the Administration tax reform proposal
differs from that of most others in a number of important respects. First, two
general—equilibrium effects have largely been ignored in earlier studies: (1)
the level of interest rates will decline by a percentage point in response to
both a decline in the demand for funds to finance real capital outlays and an
increase in the supply of funds and (2) the property tax rate on primary
residences will decline because the loss of the deductibility of property taxes
raises the price of municipally—supplied services and lowers the demand for
them. Second, the basic rental housing model is misspecified in two ways:(1)
risky net operating income and near—riskiess tax depreciation cash flows are
discounted at the same rate and (2) refinancing to keep the loan—to—value ratio
near its optimal level is prohibited, thereby creating artificial gains from
trading.
Our results differ significantly from those of most studies. The
general—equilibrium effects on owner—occupied housing ——theone point decline
in interest rates and the decline in property tax rates ——willoffset the
negative direct effects ——theCut in marginal tax rates and loss of
deductibility of property taxes ——inthe aggregate. There will, however, be
distributional effects. Owner—occupied housing will generally be cheaper for
households with incomes below $40,000 ——especiallybelow $25,000 ——butwill
be more expensive for those with incomes above $60,000. This constitutes an
improvement in both efficiency and equity because under current law the price
of owner housing services is far lower for high income households than for low
income households. Flomeownership rates should increase by 2 to 3 percentage
points for households with incomes below $40,000 and 1 to 2 percentage points
in the aggregate.—23—
A 7 percent increase in market rents (11 percent without the decline in
interest rates) is projected. Consideration of the individual components of
the Administration plan suggests that the only significant negative provision
is the cut in the personal tax rate from 0.53 (including a 6 percent state and
local rate deductible at the Federal level) to 0.41. Without this cut (and the
decline in interest rates which is largely attributable to the cut), market
rents would fall by 6 percent. Rents rise only because rental housing is a
negatively taxed asset in the sense that a tax cut lowers the supply of the
asset. Given that a major motivation of tax reform is to improve efficiency
and equity by taxing different sources of income and returns from assets more
equally, the 7 percent increase in rents (and the expected 2 percent decline in
"rents" on commercial property) is surprisingly low.
The special provisions of the tax plan ——theelimination of tax—exempt
financing, of the deductibility of interest for second homes, and of the
special treatment of low—income housing ——havenot been analyzed. These
provisions do not affect market rents generally, and much of the benefit from
the provisions is not even targeted to especially needy households. Part of
the benefits are captured by developers, builders, and lenders, and the
deductibility for second homes provides significant benefits only for
households with second homes valued above $100,000. Finally, even the
"targeted" programs are known to be poorly targeted (Gainer, 1985 and Olsen,
1982)—24—
FOOTNOTES
1For our analysis of the first three proposals see Hendershott and Ling
(1984c); the Treasury plan was considered in Hendershott and Ling (1985).
2The interest sensitivity of foreign net saving to international interestrate
differentials. However, the tendency for foreign central banks to move their
interest rates with American rates, the large role the U.S. plays in world
capital markets, and differences in preferences and risks across national
boundaries all ensure that a significant decline will occur.
3Even with low supply price elasticities, long—runprice changes are small
relative to long—run rent changes. Short—run price changes will also be small
if investors anticipate future rent increases, which they will almost certainly
do in light of the wide publicity given the most outlandish rent increase
numbers. On both of these points, see Fiendershott and Ling (l984a).
4Alternatively, we take into account the gains from optimally trading taxable
bonds [see Hendershott's application (1985) of Constantidines and Ingersolls
analysis (1984) to the determination of tax—exempt coupon].
5These calculations follow themethodology of Hendershott and Slemrod (1983).
6For example, under current law themarginal federal tax rate for the $17,500
AGI owner is 14 percent. With a 3 percent state and local rate, the total
marginal rate is equal to .14 +(l—.14).03 =.166.For the $17,500 renter, the
total marginal rate (.19) is the federal marginal rate of 16 percent plus the
full 3 percent state and local rate because this household does not itemize.—25—
7Disallowedlosses for real estate investments would generally be carried
forward until the year of sale because the amount at risk during the operating
years will usually not otherwise increase; only when principal repayment of
debt exceeds tax depreciation will taxable income exceed cash distributions.
In the year of sale, loss carry forwards can be written off against ordinary
income to the extent that gains from the sale increase the at—risk basis, i.e.,
the capital gain (net selling price minus the adjusted basis) is greater than
sales proceeds or the selling price less the outstanding mortgage balance.
This will usually be the case because the rate of tax depreciation will
generally exceed the rate of mortgage principal amortization. Thus, tax
deductions would not be eliminated, but merely postponed to the year of sale.
8Net investment income isgross income less deductions directly connected with
the production of investment income. Interest is not included in investment
expenses for this purpose, and depreciation deduction is limited to the amount
that would have been allowed had the property been depreciated under the
straight—line method over its useful life.—26—
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Table 1
Tax Rates of Owners and Renters:
Three Different Household Types
Adjusted Gross Income (thousands)
17.5 27.5 40 70 130









Married; 2 Earners; No Dependents
.190 .255 .309 .411 .483
.166 .189 .251 .364 .455
.146 .211 .279 .402 .476
.180 .185 .290 .300 .410
.180 .185 .190 .300 .410
.099 .135 .198 .300 .410
.190 .255 .309 .411 .483
.166 .209 .251 .364 .455









Renter Marginal .180 .185 .290 .410
Owner Marginal .180 .185 .290 .410
Tenure Choice .099 .135 .228 .410
Single; No Dependents
Current Law
Renter Marginal .230 .363 .405 .525 .530
Owner Marginal .224 .325 .366 .525 .530
Tenure Choice .214 .327 .396 .510 .530
Administration Plan
Renter Marginal .180 .285 .390 .400 .410
-Owner Marginal .180 .285 .298 .400 .410
Tenure Choice .132 .228 .278 .400 .410—29—
Table 2
Major Tax Provisions Affecting Rental Housing






Land Nominal Gains at Nominal Gains at 50%
40% of Regular Rate of Regular Rate or Real
Gains at Regular Rate
Structures Nominal Gains at Real Gains at
40% of Regular Rate Regular Rate
Depreciation Tax 175% 08 or SL 112% DB or SL over 28
Deductions over 18 years, years, indexed,
10% in year 1 4% in year 1
Construction Period Amortized over Capitalized
Interest and Property 10 ?ears
Taxes
Limited Partners Subject no yes
to Investment Interest
Rules
All Investors Subject no yes
to At—Risk Rules—30—
Table 3
Impact of Administration Plan on Rents"
Components of Plan % Change in Rents
Administration Plan Excluding







Cut in Personal Tax Rate 15
Full Administration Plan, Continuous
Refinancing, Dual Discount Rate
No Change in Interest Rates 11
One Percentage Point Decline
Residential Property 7
Commercial Propertya —2
aDiffers from residentialproperty only in that straight—line depreciation is
assumed under current law.—31—
Table 4
Changes in Homeownership Rates




Level HH1 HH2 HH3
17,500 .052 .040 .030
27,500 .029 .024 .009
40,000 .019 .026 —.003
70,000 .001 .002 —.018
130,000 .004 .005 —.017
HH1: married, one earner, two dependents.
HH2: married, two earners, zero dependents.
HH3: single, zero dependents.—32—
Table5
Percentage Change in the Marginal Costs of Obtaining
Housing Services from owner—Occupied Housing
Increase in Net—of—Tax Property Tax Rate
AGI 11% Interest Rate 10% Interest Rate
HH1 HH2 HH3 HH1 HH2 HH3
17,500 6 —6 —6
27,500 2 4 9 —4 —2 2
40,000 8 1 12 2 —5 6
70,000 11 11 21 5 5 14
130,000 12 12 20 6 6 14
Constant Net—of—Tax Property Tax Rate
AGI 11% Interest Rate 10% Interest Rate
HH1 HF12 HFI3 HHI FJH2 HH3
17,500 —1 —l 4 —7 —7 —3
27,500 — 2 5 —6 —4 —1
40,000 6 —2 8 —l —8 1
70,000 7 7 13 1 1 7
130,000 6 6 13 — 6
HH1: married, one earner, two dependents.
HH2: married, two earners, zero dependents.
HH3: single, zero dependents.—33—
Table 6
Percentage Change in the After—Tax Cost
of Mortgage and Property Tax Payments
Increase in Net—of—Tax Property Tax Rate






Constant Net—of—Tax Property Tax Rate

























HH2; married, two earners, zero dependents.
HH3: single, zero dependents.
UH1 HH2 HH3
1 8
5 10
11 —1
15
16
37
16 16 33
HH1 HH3
—1 —1 5
5
7 —4 10
9 9 22
7 7 21
2 14